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1 Introduction 
In this paper we study the relation of the Mas-Collel bargaining set and the set of 
competitive allocations of an economy with differential information and a continuum 
of traders. Our aim is not only to determine whether there are equivalence results sim-
ilar to those found for complete information economies, but also to explore whether 
the bargaining set discriminates between traders with differential information. In-
deed, when there is no information exchange between the traders, we find that the 
(private) bargaining set coincides with the set of Radner competitive equilibrium allo-
cations, which in turns has been shown to coincide with the (private) core and the set 
of (private) value allocations. When there is information exchange, the (weak fine) 
bargaining set contains the set of competitive equilibrium allocations of an associated 
symmetric information economy in which each trader has the ''joint information" of 
all the traders in the original economy. However, the weak fine bargaining set may 
contain allocations that are not competitive in the associated symmetric information 
economy, which suggests that the weak fine bargaining set discriminates in favor of 
those agents with an information advantage. 
There is a large literature studying the cooperative foundations of competitive 
equilibria. In this literature the core is introduced as a solution concept that, without 
appealing to an specific institutional framework, identifies the allocations that may 
result from a multilateral bargaining situation in which traders discuss alternative 
mutually beneficial trades. A difficulty of the core as a solution concept is that when 
a coalition threats to break an agreement it does not take into account how other 
coalitions may react to this threat; i.e., coalitional objections to a proposed allocation 
are not required to be robust to possible counterobjections. To address this issue, 
Aumann and Maschler (1964) introduce the notion of bargaining set for cooperative 
games with finitely many players. In the definition of the bargaining set, coalitional 
objections to a proposed agrement that admit counterobjections are disregarded; that 
is, when demanding improvements, coalitions must take account of the reactions of 
other coalitions-for a discussion of this issue, see Maschler (1976 and 1992). Mas-
Collel (1989) introduces a new notion of bargaining set and shows that in a complete 
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information exchange economy with a continuum of traders it coincides with the set 
of competitive allocations. The equivalence of the core, the set of value allocations 
and the set of competitive equilibrium allocations in this context was established by 
Aumann-see Aumann (1964 and 1975). 
Radner (1968 and 1982) introduces a model of exchange economy with differential 
information in which every trader is characterized by a state dependent utility func-
tion, a random initial endowment, an information partition, and a prior belief. In this 
framework, traders arrange contingent contracts for trading commodities before they 
obtain any information about the realized state of nature. Radner (1968) extends the 
notion of Arrow-Debreu competitive equilibrium to this model. In the definition of 
competitive equilibrium (in the sense of Radner), the information of an agent places 
a restriction on his feasible trades (i.e., his budget set): better information allows 
for more contingent trades (i.e., enlarges the agent's budget set). Thus, a Radner 
competitive equilibrium rewards the information advantage of a trader. 
In the context of exchange economies with differential information and finitely 
many traders, Yannelis (1991) introduces the concept of private core and proves that 
it is non-empty; Krasa and Yannelis (1994) introduce the notion of private value 
allocation, and discuss examples where the private value rewards the information 
advantage of a trader. In this approach, the traders of a coalition use only their pri-
vate information (Le., there is no information exchange). Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz 
(1998) show that in a Radner type economy with a continuum of traders the private 
core coincides with the set of Radner competitive equilibrium allocations, and Einy 
and Shitovitz (1998) establish the analogous result for the set of private value allo-
cations. Thus, as pointed out by Koutsougeras and Yannelis (1993) and Krasa and 
Yannelis (1994), the private core and private value reward the information advantage 
of a trader. Our findings in the present paper confirm these results: we introduce 
the notion of Mas-Collel private bargaining set, and we show that in a Radner type 
economy with a continuum of traders this set coincides with the set of Radner com-
petitive allocations. Our proof that the Mas-Collel private bargaining set coincides 
with the set of Radner competitive equilibrium allocations is along the line of the 
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proof of Mas-Collel (1989), although the details of some of the arguments require 
more involved constructions because we must deal with the measurability restrictions 
imposed by the traders differential information, and also with the possibility that 
competitive prices may not be strictly positive. 
An interesting question is whether the information advantage of a trader is re-
warded when we account for the possibility that traders in a coalition may com-
municate and share some of their information. These possibilities are captured by 
the notion of fine core due to Wilson (1978). Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz (1998) 
show that the set of (weak) fine core allocations of a Radner type economy with a 
continuum of traders coincides with set of competitive equilibrium allocations of an 
associated economy with symmetric information in which each trader has the "joint 
information" of all the traders in the original economy. Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz 
(1999) establish an analogous result for fine value allocations. Thus, these results 
suggest that when the possibility of sharing information is introduced the informa-
tion advantage of a trader is worthless. Interestingly, this is not the case when we 
use the weak fine bargaining set as the solution concept: we find that in a Radner 
type economy with a continuum of traders the weak fine bargaining set contains the 
competitive allocations of the associated symmetric information economy, albeit it 
may also contain other allocations where the traders with an information advantage 
are more favorably treated. Thus, in contrast with the weak fine core and the set of 
weak fine value allocations, the weak fine bargaining set may reward the information 
advantage of a trader. 
2 The Model 
We consider a Radner-type exchange economy [; with differential information (e.g., 
Radner (1968 and 1982)). 
The space of traders is a measure space (T,~, J-L), where T is a set (the set of 
traders), ~ is a a-field of subsets of T (the set of coalitions), and J-L is a non-atomic 
measure on ~. The commodity space is ~++. The space of states of nature is a finite 
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set !1. The economy extends over two time periods, T = 0,1. Consumption takes 
place at T = 1. At T = 0 there is uncertainty over the state of nature; in this period 
traders arrange contracts that may be contingent on the realized state of nature at 
T = 1. At T = 1 traders do not necessarily know which state of nature wEn 
actually occurred, although they know their own endowments, and may also have 
some additional information about the state of nature. We do not assume, however, 
that traders know their own utility function. 
The information of a trader t E T is described by a partition TIt of!1. We denote 
by Ft the field generated by TIt. If Wo is the true state of nature, at T = 1 trader t 
observes the member of TIt which contains Wo. Every trader t E T has a probability 
distribution qt on n which represents his prior beliefs. The preferences of a trader 
t E T are represented by a state dependent utility junction, Ut : n x ~++ ~ lR such 
that for every (t, X)E n x lR~+, the mapping (t, x) ~ Ut (w, x) is ~ x B measurable, 
where w is a fixed member of n, and B is the a-field of Borel subsets of lR~+. If x 
is a random bundle (i.e., a function from n to lR~+) we denote by ht(x) the expected 
utility of trader t E T from x. That is 
ht(x) = L qt(w)Ut(w, x(w)). 
wEn 
An assignment is a function x : T x !1 ~ lR~+ such that for every wEn the 
function x(·,w) is j.L-integrable on T. There is a fixed initial assignment e; e(t,w) 
represents the initial endowment of trader t E T in the state of nature w E !1. We 
assume that for every t ET the function e(t,·) is Ft-measurable. 
In the rest of the paper, an economy £ is an atomless economy with differential 
information as described above. Also we use the following notation: For two vectors 
x = (Xl, ... , Xl) and y = (YI, ... , yz) in lRl we write X 2:: y when Xk 2:: Yk for all 
1 ~ k ~ 1, x > y when x 2:: y and x =f y, and x » y when Xk > Yk for alII ~ k ~ 1. 
Let £ be an economy. A private allocation is an assignment x such that 
(2.1) for almost all t E T the function x(t,·) is Ft-measurable, and 
(2.2) fTx(t,w)dj.L ~ fTe(t,w)dj.L for all wE!1. 
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A price system is a non-zero function p : n --+ ~~. Let t E T. Write M t for the set of 
all Frmeasurable functions from n to ~~+. For a price system p, define the budget 
set of t by 
B(p, t) = {x I x E Mt and LP(w), x(w) :::; LP(w) . e(t, W)} . 
wEn wEn 
A competitive equilibrium (in the sense of Radner) is a pair (p, x) where p is a price 
system and x is private allocation such that 
(2.3) for almost all t E T the function x(t,·) maximizes ht on B(p, t), and 
A competitive allocation is a private allocation x for which there exists a price system 
p such that (p, x) is a competitive equilibrium. 
Note that since n is a finite set there is a finite family {IIi}~=l of partitions of 
n such that for all t E T there is 1 :::; i :::; n with IIt = IIi . We assume that for all 
1 :S i :::; n, the set 1i = {t E T I IIt = IIi} is measurable, and /-l(1i) > O. For all 
1 :S i :S n we denote by Fi the field generated by IIi . 
Throughout the paper we assume that for all t E T and wEn the function 
Ut (w, .) is strictly increasing and continuous on ~~+. (A function u : ~~+ --+ ~ is 
strictly increasing if for all x, y E ~++, x > y implies u(x) > u(y). ) 
3 The Private Bargaining Set 
In this section we introduce the notion of (Mas-Collel) private bargaining set, and 
show that it coincides with the set of (Radner) competitive allocations. We begin by 
defining the private core, and then we extend to our model the definition of private 
core due to Yannelis (1991). 
Let E be an economy, and let x be a private allocation. A private objection to x 
is a pair (8, y) such that 
(3.1) /-l(8) > 0, 
(3.2) y(t,') is Ft-measurable for almost all t E 8, 
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(3.3) fsy(t,w)dJ.L:::; fse(t,w) for all wE 0, 
(3.4) ht(y(t, .)) ~ ht(x(t,.)) for almost all t E S, and 
(3.5) J.L({t E S I ht(y(t,.)) > ht(x(t,.))}) > O. 
An assignment x is a private core allocation of £ if it has no private objection. The 
private core of £ is the set of all private core allocations of £. 
In defining the core, usually the inequalities (3.4) are strict, and (3.5) is omit-
ted. Since in our framework the utility functions of the traders are continuous and 
strictly increasing in every state of nature, these alternative definition of the core are 
equivalent. 
Let £ be an economy, let x be a private allocation and let (S, y) be a private 
objection to x. A private counterobjection to (S,y) is a pair (Q,z) such that 
(3.6) J.L( Q) > 0, 
(3.7) z(t,·) is Ft-measurable for almost all t E Q, 
(3.8) fQz(t,w)dJ.L:::; fQe(t,w) for all wE 0, 
(3.9) ht(z(t, .)) > ht(y(t, .)) for almost all t E Q n S, and 
(3.10) ht(z(t, .)) > ht(x(t, .)) for almost all t E Q\S. 
A private objection to x, (S, y), is justified if it has not private counterobjection. 
The (Mas-Collel) private bargaining set is the set of private allocations which have 
no justified private objection. Note that the private core of an economy £ is a subset 
of the private bargaining set of £. 
Theorem A. The private bargaining set of an economy £ coincides with the set of 
Radner competitive allocations of £. 
Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz (1998) have established that the set ofRadner com-
petitive equilibrium allocations of an economy £ as defined here coincides with the 
private core of £. Since the private core is a subset of the private bargaining set, in 
order to prove Theorem A it suffices to show that every private bargaining set allo-
cation of £ is a competitive allocation of £. Our proof of this result is along the lines 
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of the proof of Theorem 1 in Mas-Collel (1989), although the details of some of the 
arguments require more involved constructions because we must deal with the mea-
surability restrictions imposed by the traders differential information, and also with 
the possibility that competitive prices may not be strictly positive. (In spite of the 
fact that traders utility functions are strictly increasing, in an economy with differ-
ential information we cannot guarantee that competitive prices are strictly positive.) 
In establishing this result, the notion of competitive objection will be useful. 
A private objection (S, y) to x is a competitive objection if there is a price system 
p such that for almost all t E T 
(3.13) if t E Sand Z E Mt satisfies ht(z) > ht(y(t, .)), then EWEnP(w) . z(w) > 
EWEnP(w) . e(t,w), and 
(3.14) if t E T\S and z E M t satisfies ht(z) ~ ht(x(t, .)), then EWEnP(w) . z(w) ~ 
EWEnP(w) . e(t,w). 
Theorem A is a consequence of the following two lemmata. 
Lemma 3.1. Every competitive objection (8, y) to a private allocation x is justified. 
Proof: Let (S, y) be competitive objection to an allocation x, and let p be the 
price system associated with (8, y). Assume contrary to our claim that there is a 
private counterobjection (Q,z) to (S,y). Then ht(z(t,.)) > ht(y(t,·)) for almost all 
t E Q n S, and ht(z(t, .)) > ht(x(t, .)) for almost all t E Q\S. Since for all t E T 
and all wEn, Ut(w,·) is strictly increasing and e(t,w) »0, and since (S,y) is a 
competitive objection, for almost all t E Q we have 
LP(w). z(t,w) > LP(w). e(t,w). 
wEn wEn 
This contradicts that for all wEn, JQz(t,w)dj.l ~ JQe(t,w)dj.l. 0 
Lemma 3.2. If x is not a competitive allocation, then there is a competitive objection 
to x. 
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Proof: Throughout the proof we assume without loss of generality that J-t{T) = l. 
Assume that x is not a competitive allocation. We construct a competitive objection 
to x. Define 
p ~ Q {p E (!J1'+)o I ~ tp;(W) ~ 1 and ~p(W) »0, for all A E II;} . 
Then P is a no~-empty convex subset of (~~)n. Now for pEP and t E T, the budget 
set B{p, t) is a compact subset of Mt. Therefore the function ht attains a maximum 
on B(p, t). For all pEP and all t E T let 
D{p, t) = {x E Mt I x maximizes ht on B{p, t)}, 
and 
D{p, t) if ht{D{p, t)) > ht{x{t, .)) 
F{p, t) = D(p, t) u {e(t, .)} if ht(D(p, t)) = ht(x(t, .)) 
{e(t,.)} if ht(D{p, t)) < ht(x(t, .)). 
Let 
and let 
and 
k = {x E K I 'Ltx;{w) = a}. 
wEn ;=1 
Note that K is a non-empty compact convex subset of (~~+)n. Write P for the closure 
of P, and define a correspondence cp : P X T __ 2K by 
F(p, t) n K if pEP and D{p, t) n K =I 0 
cp(p, t) = k n {Ad I dE F{p, t), A ~ O} if pEP and D(p, t) n K = 0 
B(p, t) n k if p E P\P. 
For every pEP define 
'!f;(p) = £ cp{p, t)dJ-t - £ e(t, .)dJ-t. 
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Then for every pEP, 'Ij;(p) is a non-empty convex subset of the compact convex 
set K. The proof that 'Ij; is also upper semicontinuous on P is standard. From the 
definition of'lj; it is clear that for all pEP we have p. 'Ij;(p) ~ o. Therefore by (1) in 
Section 5.6 of Debreu (1959), there exists p* E P and z* E 'Ij;(p*) such that z* ~ o. We 
show that p* ~ P\P. Supposep* E P\P; thenz* E UT(B(p*,t)nK)dJ1- ITe(t,.)dJ1). 
Therefore 
I I 
LLzj(w) = Q - LL 1 ej(t,.)dJ1 = 1, 
wEn j=l wEn j=l T 
which contradicts z* ~ o. Thus p* ~ P\P. As z* ~ 0 we have 
Hence there exists an integrable function f on T such that f(t) E F(p*, t) for all 
t E T and z* = IT f(t)dJ1- ITe(t, ·)dJ1. Write 
8 = {t E T I f(t) E D(p*, t)}, 
and 
C(p*) = {t E T I ht(D(p*,t)) > ht(x(t,·))}. 
Since x is not a competitive allocation we have J1(C(p*)) > o. As C(p*) c 8, J1(8) > O. 
Now for all (t,w) ET x n let 
y(t, w) = (J(t))(w). 
We show that (8, y) is a competitive objection to x. As noted above, J1(8) > O. Since 
z* ~ 0 and f(t) = e(t,·) for t E T\8, we have 
is y(t, w)dJ1 ~ is e(t, w)dJ1, 
for all wEn. By the definition ofy we have ht(y(t,·)) ~ ht(x(t,·)),for all t E 8, 
and ht(y(t, .)) > ht(x(t,·)) for all t E C(p*). If t E 8 and z E Mt satisfies ht(z) ~ 
ht(y(t, .)), then ht(D(p*, t)) ~ ht(z). Therefore 
LP*(W) . z(w) ~ LP*(w) . e(t,w). 
wEn wEn 
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Let t E T\8. Then ht(D(P*,t)) ::s ht(x(t,·)). Therefore if Z E M t satisfies ht(z) ~ 
ht(x(t,.)), then ht(z) ~ ht(D(p*,t)), and thus 
LP*(W) . z(w) ~ LP*(w), e(t,w). 
wEn wEn 
This completes the proof that (8, y) is a competitive objection to x. 0 
4 The Weak Fine Bargaining Set 
In this section we introduce the notion of weak fine bargaining set and study its 
relation with the set of competitive allocations. 
Let £ be an economy, and let 8 EL:. Define 
. 1(8) = {i 11 ::s i ::s nand 1-£(8 n 7i) > O}. 
where nand 1i are defined in Section 2. A weak fine allocation is an assignment x 
such that 
(4.1) For almost all t E T, x(t,') is V~=l.}i-measurable, and 
(4.2) IT x( t, w)dl-£ ::s Is e( t, w) for all wEn. 
Let x be a weak fine allocation. A weak fine objection to x is a pair (8, y) such that 
(4.3) 1-£(8) > 0, 
(4.4) y(t,·) is ViEI(S) .}i-measurable for all t E 8, 
(4.5) Isy(t,w)dJ-l::S Ise(t,w) for all WE!1, 
(4.6) ht(y(t, .)) ~ ht(x(t,·)) for almost all t E 8, and 
(4.7) J-l({t E 8 I ht(y(t, .)) > ht(x(t, .))}) > O. 
A weak fine core allocation of £ is a weak fine allocation x which has no weak fine 
objection. The weak fine core of £ is the set of all weak fine core allocations of £. 
The weak fine core was introduced in AlIen (1991) and Koutsougeras and Yannelis 
(1993). In order to define the weak fine bargaining set we need to introduce the 
definition of weak fine counterobjection. 
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Let £ be an economy, let x be a weak fine allocation, and let (S, y) be a weak fine 
objection to x. A weak fine counterobjection to (S, y) is a pair (Q, z) such that 
(4.8) J-L( Q) > 0, 
(4.9) z(t,·) is ViEI(Q) Fi-measurable for almost all t E Q, 
(4.10) IQz(t,w)dJ-L::; IQe(t,w) for all wEn, 
(4.11) ht(z(t, .)) > ht(y(t, .)) for almost all t E Q n S, and 
(4.12) ht(z(t, .)) > ht(x(t,·)) for almost all t E Q\S. 
A weak fine objection (S, y) to a weak fine allocation x is justified if it has not weak 
fine counterobjection. The (Mas-Collel) weak fine bargaining set is the set of weak 
fine allocations which have no justified weak fine objection. 
Let £ be an economy. Denote by £* the economy obtained from £ by giving 
to each trader in £ the joint information of all the traders in £, i.e., for all t E T, 
Ft = V tET Ft, and leaving the rest of his characteristics unchanged. Note that in 
£* all traders have the same information (i.e., £* is an economy with symmetric 
information) . 
Proposition 4.1. Every competitive allocation of £* is in the weak fine bargaining 
set of £. 
Proof: It is easy to see that an economy £ as defined satisfies the assumptions 
of Theorem C in Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz (1998), which establishes that the set of 
competitive allocations of £* coincides with the weak fine core of £. Since the weak 
fine core is a subset of the weak fine bargaining set, Proposition 4.1 readily follows 
from this result. 0 
As the following example shows, the analog of Theorem C in Einy, Moreno and 
Shitovitz (1998) for the weak fine bargaining set does not hold: there are allocations 
in the weak fine bargaining set that are not competitive allocations of £*. For the 
analysis of the example we need some notation and a lemma which is interesting on 
its own. 
11 
If £ is an economy and 8 is a coalition with J-l(8) > 0, we denote by £s the 
restriction of £ to 8; that is, £s is an economy for which the space of traders is 
(8, Es, J-ls), where Es = {Q I Q E E, Qc 8}, and J-ls is the restriction of J-l to Es. 
Lemma 4.2. Let £ be an economy. Assume that (8, y) is a justified weak fine 
objection to a weak fine allocation x in £. Then the restriction of y to 8 x n is a 
competitive allocation of cs. 
Proof: Assume by way of contradiction that the restriction y of y to 8 x n is 
not competitive in cs. Then by Theorem C of Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz (1998), y 
is not in the weak fine core of Cs. Therefore y has a weak fine objection (Q,z) in cs. 
Let z be an extension of z to an assignment in £. As Q c 8, (Q, z) is a weak fine 
counterobjection to (8, y) in £. But this contradicts our assumption that (8, y) is a 
weak fine justified objection to x in £. 0 
Example 4.3: Consider an economy £ in which the commodity space is ~++, and 
the set of traders is ([0,3], E, J-l), where E is the a-field of Borel subsets of [0,3] and 
J-l is the Lebesgue measure. The space of states of nature is n = {WI' W2}' All traders 
have the same utility function, given for (w, x) E n x ~++ by 
u(W, x) = lnx. 
The initial assignment is e(t,w) = 2, for all (t,w) ET x n. Let TI = [0,1], T2 = (1,2]' 
and T3 = (2,3]. The information partition of a trader t E TI U T2 is ITI = IT2 = {n} , 
and that of the traders t in T3 is IT3 = {{ WI}, {W2} } . The priors of the traders in TI, 
T2, and T3 are, respectively, ql = (i, ~), q2 = (~, i), and q3 = (~, ~). We construct a 
weak fine bargaining set allocation of £ which is not competitive in £*. 
Define an assignment x : T x n --+ ~++ by 
and 
1 t E TI 
x(t, wd = 2.55 t E T2 
2.45 t E T3 , 
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2.55 t E Tl 
2.45 t E T3 . 
Then x is a weak fine allocation in £. We show that x is in the weak fine bargaining 
set of £, but it is not competitive in £*. Assume, by way of contradiction, that (S, y) 
is a justified weak fine objection to x in £. Then by Lemma 4.2 the restriction y of 
y to S x n is a competitive allocation in £s. Now if J-L(S n T3 ) = 0, then we must 
have that y(t,w) = e(t,w) for all (t,w) E S x n. As ht(e(t, .)) < ht(x(t, .)) for all 
t E Tl U T2, this leads to a contradiction. Assume that J-L(S n T3 ) > O. Let p be a 
price system such that (p, y) is a competitive equilibrium of £s. Then P(Wl) > 0 and 
p(W2) > O. Without loss of generality assume that P(W2) = 1, and denote p = P(Wl)' 
Define z : T x n --t 1R++ by 
~(1 + ~) t E Tl 
z(t,wd = ~(1 + ~) t E T2 
1+2 p t E T3 , 
and 
~(1 + p) t E Tl 
Z(t,W2) = ~(1 + p) t E T2 
l+p t E T3 . 
Then the first order conditions for utility maximization imply that y coincides with 
the restriction of z to S x n for some p > O. Since J-L(8) > 0 and (p, y) is a competitive 
equilibrium of £s, we have 
( 1) 16 1 + P (1 + p) ~ "3 < (2.45)2. 
Therefore for all t E S n T3 we have 
ht(y(t, .)) = ~ In [(1 + t) (1 + p)] < ~ In (2.45)2 = ht{x(t, .)). 
As J-L(8 nT3 ) > 0, this contradicts the assumption that (8, y) is a weak fine objection 
to x. 
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The above argument shows that if, in particular, v is a competitive allocation of 
£*, then for all t E T3 
ht(v(t, .)) < ht(x(t, .)). 
Therefore x is. not a competitive allocation of £*. Note that the last inequality 
implies that the informed traders (i.e., the traders in T3 ) are better off in x than in 
any competitive allocation of £* . 
14 
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